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Two Theorems on the Range of Strategy-proof
Rules on a Restricted Domain
Donald E. Campbell · Jerry S. Kelly
Abstract
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of
profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any
other and let g have range S on NP . We complete
the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S
contains more than two elements, then g is dictatorial -
by establishing a full range result on two subdomains of NP .
1. Introduction.
2. Notation.
3. N−Range Theorem: Part 1.
4. N−Range Theorem: Part 2.
5. M−Range Theorem.
1. Introduction.
In Campbell and Kelly (2010), we discussed losses due to manipulation
of social choice rules and gave an example of a non−dictatorial rule such that,
for any manipulation, no one else has a loss. Where all individual preferences are
strict, that means that for any manipulation, everyone gains. We say such rules
satisfy universally beneficial manipulation (UBM); this property is a weakening
of Gibbard-Satterthwaite individual stra tegy-proofness.
In Campbell and Kelly (2014a), we present two characterizations of
UBM rules. The proof in that paper uses structural results from the fact that a
UBM rule g must satisfy strategy-proofness on the subdomain NP of all profiles
with the property that no alternative Pareto-dominates any other.
In Campbell and Kelly (2014b), we derive those structural results: A
rule g that is strategy-proof on NP and has range of at least three alternatives
must be dictatorial. That proof, in turn, required, for two induction steps, the
result that if strategy-proof g is of full range on NP it is also of full range on
two special subdomains of NP . This paper completes the analysis by proving
these two range results.
2. Notation.
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We adopt all terminology and notation from Campbell and Kelly (2014b).
In particular, we take as given a finite set X of alternatives with |X | = m ≥ 3
and finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals with n ≥ 3. A (strong) ordering
on X is a complete, asymmetric, transitive relation on X and the set of all
such orderings is L(X). For R ∈ L(X) and Y ⊂ X let R|Y denote the relation
R ∩ Y × Y on y, the restriction of R to y. A profile p is a map from n to
L(X), where p = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n)) and we write x ≻p(h) y if individual h
strongly prefers x to y at profile p. The set of all profiles is L(X)N . Let ℘ be
a nonempty subset of L(X)N . For each subset Y of X and each profile p in ℘,
let p|Y denote the restriction of profile p ∈ ℘ to Y . That is, p|Y represents the
function q ∈ L(Y )N satisfying q(i) = p(i)|Y for all i ∈ N . A social choice rule
on ℘ is a function g : ℘ → X . A rule g is full-range if Range(g) = X , and
g is dictatorial if there is an individual i such that g(p) is the highest ranked
element in Range(g) according to ordering p(i).
In this paper, we consider social choice rules on the Non-Paretian do-
main, NP , the set of all profiles p such that for any pair of distinct alternatives,
x and y, there exists an individual i ∈ N such that x ≻p(i) y and there ex-
ists an individual j ∈ N such that y ≻p(j) x, so that neither alternative is
Pareto-superior to the other.
Two profiles p and q are h-variants, where h ∈ N , if q(i) = p(i) for all
i 6= h. Individual h can manipulate the social choice rule g : ℘→ X at p via p′
if p and p′ belong to ℘, p and p′ are h-variants, and g(p′) ≻p(h) g(p). And g is
strategy-proof if no one can manipulate g at any profile.
3. The N−Range Theorem: Part 1.
As observed earlier, our focus is on the range of g restricted to special sub-
domains of NP . We define NP ∗ to be the subdomain of all profiles u on which
individials n− 1 and n agree: u(n− 1) = u(n). The goal is to show
Theorem 3-1. (The N-Range Theorem). If. m = 3 and g on NP is of
full range, so is g|NP ∗.
We address the converse: We assume that g|NP ∗ is of less than full range
and use that to show g must be of less than full range on NP . We will actually
do this in two parts by establishing
Theorem 3-2. (The N-Range Theorem, Part 1). If m = 3 and g|NP ∗ has
range of just two alternatives then g must be of less than full range on NP .in
this section and then proving
Theorem 4-1. (The N-Range Theorem, Part 2). If m = 3 and g|NP ∗ has
range of just one alternative then g must be of less than full range on NP .in
Section 4.
The more detailed strategy for proving Theorem 3-2 starts by deter-
mining a very short list L of profiles such that if x is chosen at some profile in
NP it will also have to be chosen at a profile in L. Then for each profile u in
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L, we exploit a decisiveness structure for g|NP ∗ to show that x is not chosen
at u if x is not chosen in NP ∗. Typically, we will assume x is chosen at u and
shoow that leads to a manipulability at some profile in NP , a contradiction of
strategy-proofness.
Section 3-1. The list of profiles
Lemma 3-3. Suppose Range(g|NP ∗) = {y, z}. There exists a list L of
three profiles (along with other profiles that can be transformed from a member
of L by switching y and z everywhere; or switching preferences of n − 1 and n
or switching orderings within the set of individuals i < n− 1) such that, if x ∈
Range(g), for strategy-proof g, then x = g(u) for some u in the list L.
Proof of Lemma 3-3: A profile u in the list L will be described in terms
of where x appears in the orderings for individuals n− 1 and n.
Suppose x is at the bottom of both u(n− 1) and u(n). Then it is possible
to switch y and z for one of the two to get a profile u∗ that is not just in NP ,
but in NP ∗, so g(u∗) 6= x. But then the switching individual would manipulate
from u to u∗, a violation of strategy-proofness.
Similarly, suppose x is at the top of both u(n − 1) and u(n). Then it is
possible to switch y and z for one of the two to get a profile u∗ that is in NP ∗,
so g(u∗) 6= x. But then the switching individual would manipulate from u∗ to
u, a violation of strategy-proofness. There remain four possibilities:
I. x is at the top for one and at the bottom for the other;
II. x is at the bottom for one and in the middle for the other;
III. x is at the top for one and in the middle for the other;
IV. x is in the middle for both.
Case I. Suppose x is at the top for n and at the bottom for n− 1 for profile
u0 where g(u0) = x. Then profile u1 is constructed from u0 by switching y and
z for either n − 1 or n so y and z are ordered by n − 1 the opposite of their
ordering by n. We have g(u1) = x or g is manipulable. Then raise x to the top
for each of the i < n− 1 in turn. The resulting profile u2 will have g(u2) = x or
else g is manipulable. Finally change the ordering of y and z for all i < n − 1
to agree with the ordering of y and z by n. Such a profile looks like
1 2 3 · · · n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
z
y
x
x
y
z
This profile, L1, will be in the list L (along with other profiles that can be
transformed from this by switching y and z everywhere; or switching preferences
of n− 1 and n, but all of these will be equivalent in that if a strategy-proof rule
could have x chosen at one but not on NP ∗, then a rule could be designed that
had x chosen at any other one but not on NP ∗.
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Case II. Suppose x is at the bottom for one and in the middle for the other,
say
1 2 3 · · · n− 1 n
· · ·
y
x
z
z
y
x
Here, if necessary, y and z will be switched for n to be oppositely ordered from
how they are ordered by n−1. If that’s not possible because every i < n−1 has
y above z, select one of them, say 1, raise x to the top of 1’s ordering, switch
y and z and then continue. But then x can be raised for n − 1 and still have
x chosen. This puts us back into Case I, so we do not have to add any profiles
from Case II to the list L.
Case III. Suppose x is at the top for one and in the middle for the other,
say
1 2 3 · · · n− 1 n
· · ·
y
x
z
x
z
y
Here, if necessary, y and z will be switched for n to be oppositely ordered from
how they are ordered by n− 1. If any i < n− 1 has y preferred to x we could
raise x in n − 1’s ordering, stay in NP , and still have x chosen. But this is a
case we have already treated. So we may assume every i < n− 1 prefers x to y.
Also to be in NP , at least one of them, say 1, must have z preferred to x:
1 2 3 · · · n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
x
y
· · ·
y
x
z
x
z
y
Then for every i such that 2 < i < n− 1, we can raise x to the top, and switch
y and z if necessary to agree with n, stay in NP and still have x chosen at the
following profile:
1 2 3 · · · n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
y
x
z
x
z
y
This profile, L2, will also be in list L (along with other profiles that can be
transformed from this by switching y and z everywhere; or switching preferences
of n− 1 and n or switching orderings within the set of individuals i < n− 1).
Case IV. Suppose x is in the middle for both. Since x is chosen we are not
in NP ∗, and the ordering for n− 1 must be the inverse of the ordering for n:
4
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
· · ·
y
x
z
z
x
y
If any i < n − 1 has y preferred to x, we could raise x to the top for n − 1,
still be in NP , and still have x chosen. That would put us in Case III, and we
wouldn’t have to add anything to list L. Similarly, if any i < n− 1 has z ≻ x,
we could raise x to the top for n, still be in NP , and still have x chosen. That
would also put us in Case III, and we wouldn’t have to add anything to list L.
So we may assume that x is at the top for every i < n− 1. Then y and z could
be switched for each i < n− 1 if necessary to be ordered the same as for n:
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
This profile, L3, will be the third and last in the list L (along with other profiles
that can be transformed from this by switching y and z everywhere; or switching
preferences of n− 1 and n). 
Section 3-2. Decisiveness structuresProof of Theorem 3-2. For
each of the three profile types in L, we exploit decisiveness structures to show
that x is not chosen at that profile.
.
Given strategy-proof rule g on the NP domain for m alternatives and n
individuals with Range(g) = {y, z}, we define a rule g∗ on the NP domain
for m alternatives and n − 1 individuals. At profile u = (u1, u2, ..., un−1), we
setg∗(u) = g(u1, u2, ..., un−1, un), where un = un−1. so g is operating on a
profile in NP ∗. We have observed earlier (Campbell and Kelly, 2014b) that g∗
is strategy-proof; it clearly has range {y, z}. A result of Barbera´ et al (2010)
can be modified to show that for g∗ there is a collection of coalitions decisive for
y against z and a related collection of coalitions decisive for z against y, each
collection satisfying a monotonicity condition: supersets of members are also
members.
Correspondingly, then, we know a decisiveness structure for g|NP ∗. Let
C be a coalition in {1, 2, ..., n− 2}.
1. If C is decisive for g∗ for y against z (z against y), then C is
decisive for g|NP ∗ for y against z (z against y).
2. If C is minimally decisive for g∗ for y against z (z against y),
then C is minimally decisive for g|NP ∗ for y against z (z against y).
3. If C ∪ {n − 1} is decisive for g∗ for y against z (z against y),
then C ∪ {n− 1, n} is decisive for g|NP ∗ for y against z (z against y).
4. If C ∪ {n − 1} is minimally decisive for g∗ for y against z
(z against y), there is no proper subset C∗ of C such that C∗ ∪ {n − 1, n} is
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decisive for g|NP ∗ for y against z (z against y). With some license, we will say
C ∪ {n− 1, n} is minimally decisive for g|NP ∗.
There are two possible categories of decisiveness structures for g∗. In
the first category, some minimal decisive coalition for y against z for g∗ is
contained in {1, ..., n− 2}. (Or, alternatively, some minimum decisive coalition
for z against y for g is contained in {1, ..., n − 2}.) Within this first category,
there are two possibilities to consider:
Case A. Some subset S of {1, ..., n− 2}, containing at least two elements,
is a minimal decisive coalition for y against z (alternatively, some subset of
{1, ..., n−2}, containing at least two elements, is a minimal decisive coalition for
z against y). Since N contains more than two individuals, we then automatically
have useful coalitions decisive (though possibly not minimally) for z against y,
namely X\S together with a non−empty proper subset of S.
Case B. Some singleton subset S of {1, ..., n − 2} is a minimal decisive
coalition for y against z. When S is a singleton, we sometimes must think
carefully about coalitions decisive for z against y (of course, since Range(g∗) =
{y, z}, some such coalitions exist).
In the second category, every minimal decisive coalition for y against z
for g∗ includes n− 1. The possibilities are that either {n− 1} itself is a minimal
decisive coalition for y against z or that every minimal decisive coalition for y
against z includes both n − 1 and some individual in {1, ..., n− 2}. But in the
latter case, some subset of {1, ..., n − 2} is a minimal decisive coalition for z
against y and we are back in Case A or Case B. So we only need to treat the
following possibility:
Case C. {n − 1} is a minimal decisive coalition for y against z for g∗ and
{n− 1} is also a minimal decisive coalition for z against y for g∗. So {n− 1, n}
is a decisive coalition for y against z and for z against y for g|NP ∗.
Accordingly, with three profiles in L to treat and, for each of those profiles,
three kinds of decisiveness structures to consider, we complete the proof by
carrying nine tasks.
Section 3-3. L1.
We want to show that for any collection of decisive coalitions, x /∈ Range(g|NP ∗)
and strategy-proofness of g will exclude the possibility that x is chosen at profile
L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
(All profiles displayed in this paper are elements of NP ; this is easily checked
and will not be further remarked upon.)
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Case L1.A. Some subset S of {1, ..., n − 2}, containing at least two
elements, is a minimal decisive coalition for y against z (alternatively, some
subset of {1, ..., n− 2}, containing at least two elements, is a minimal decisive
coalition for z against y). We treat here the case where {1, 2, .., k} is a minimal
decisive set for y against z (the case for a subset of {1, ..., n− 2} being decisive
for z against y can be dealt with similarly). Note that k = n− 2 is allowed.
We want to show that for minimal decisive coalition {1, 2, .., k}, a violation
of strategy-proofness of g will follow from an assumption that x is chosen at
profile L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
Alternative x is chosen at L1 if and only if x is chosen at L1∗:
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
with y and z reversed below x for {k + 1, ..., n− 2}.
At n-variant u1 in NP ∗:
u1 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u1) = y by decisiveness of {1, ..., k} for y against z and then at 2-variant profile
u2, also in NP ∗:
u2 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u2) = z since {1, ..., k} is a minimal decisive set for y against z on NP ∗. Next,
at n-variant profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
g(u3) = z or n manipulates from u3 to u2. Next consider 2-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
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g(u4) 6= z or n manipulates from u1 to u4. And g(u4) 6= x or 2 manipulates
from u3 to u4. So g(u4) = y. But then, if g(L1∗) = x, voter n would manipulate
from u4 to L1∗:
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
Subcase L1.B. Without loss of generality, {1} is a (minimal) decisive coalition
for y against z for g|NP ∗. There are many possible coalitions C decisive for z
against y. These must include 1, but won’t have to be minimal, so we choose
them as large as possible (though they still have to exclude at least one indi-
vidual) since a small coalitions being decisive implies supersets also decisive.
We distinguish between two possibilities, regarding which kind of individual is
excluded:
1. The individual excluded for is in {1, ..., n−2}, say n−2, so {1, ..., n−
3, n− 1, n} is decisive for z against y for g|NP ∗.
2. The individual excluded for is n − 1, so {1, ..., n − 2} is decisive
for z against y for g|NP ∗. If the minimal decisive coalition for z against y in
{1, ..., n − 2} contains an individual in addition to 1, we are in the situation
already covered in Case A. So we may assume that {1} is decisive for z against
y as well as for y against z in NP ∗. But then also {1, ..., n − 3, n − 1, n} is
decisive for z against y for g|NP ∗, and we are back to the first possibility.
So we only need to treat the case where coalition {1} is decisive for y
against z on NP ∗ and {1, ..., n− 3, n− 1, n} is decisive for z against y on NP ∗.
At L1, x is chosen by assumption:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
Then x must also be chosen at L1∗:
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
obtained by switching y and z for individuals 2, ..., n− 3.
At n-variant u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
x
y
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g(u1) 6= y or n will manipulate to L1∗. Next consider u2, another n-variant of
u1, but one that is in NP ∗:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u2) = y, since {1} is decisive for y against z on NP ∗. Then g(u1) 6= z or n
will manipulate from u2 to u1. Combining, g(u1) = x.
Now look at profile u3, also in NP ∗:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u3) = z by the decisiveness of {1, 2, ..., n−3, n−1, n} for z against y on NP ∗.
Then at n-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
x
y
g(u4) = z or n will manipulate from u4 to u3. But u4 is a 1-variant of u1 and
1 will manipulate from u4 to u1.
Case L1.C: In this case {n − 1} is decisive for y against z and also for z
against y for rule g∗, i.e., {n− 1, n} is decisive both ways for rule g|NP ∗. We
first trace out two results of decisiveness and strategy-proofness.
Result #1
We assume x is chosen at L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
and seek a contradiction. We must have g(u1) = x at 1-variant u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
or 1 manipulates from u1 to L1. Then g(u2) = x at (n− 1)-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
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or n− 1 manipulates from u1 to u2. Now g(u3) 6= y at 1-variant u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
or 1 manipulates from u3 to u2. We next show g(u3) 6= z.
At u4 in NP ∗:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
g(u4) = y by the decisiveness of {n− 1, n} on NP ∗. That implies g(u5) = y at
(n− 1)-variant profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
or n− 1 manipulates from u5 to u4. But u5 is a 1-variant of u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
So, if g(u3) = z, 1 would manipulate from u5 to u3. Therefore g(u3) 6= z.
Combining, g(u3) = x.
Result #2
Earlier we saw that if x is selected at L1 then g(u2) = x at u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
Then g(u6) = x at n-variant u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
or n manipulates from u6 to u2. Therefore g(u7) 6= y at 1-variant u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
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or 1 manipulates from u7 to u6. We next show g(u7) 6= x.
At u8 in NP ∗
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
g(u8) = z by the decisiveness of {n− 1, n} on NP ∗. Then g(u9) = z at (n− 1)-
variant u9:
u9 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
z
y
or n− 1 manipulates from u9 to u8. Then g(u10) = z at 2-variant u10:
u10 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
z
y
or 2 manipulates from u9 to u10. But u10 is an (n− 1)-variant of u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
If g(u7) = x, then n − 1 manipulates from u7 to u10. Therefore, g(u7) 6= x.
Combining, g(u7) = z.
Main Thread
By Result #1, x is chosen at u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
and by Result #2, z is chosen at u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
Then n manipulates from u7 to u3 and g violates strategy-proofness. This
establishes that x is not selected at L1 if x is not in the range of g|NP ∗.
Section 3-4. L2.
We assume that x is chosen at L2:
11
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
and seek a contradiction to strategy-proofness of g. This is more complicated
than the analysis for L1 or L3 since L2(1) is different from L2(2), ..., and
L2(n− 2) whereas for L1 and L3 all of the first n− 2 individuals have the same
ordering.
We first explain the organization of the proof, laying out a set of cases to be
considered, and then later fill in an analysis of each case and subcase.
Case L2.A: A subset S of {1, 2, ..., n − 2} is a minimal decisive set for y
against z for g∗ and so also for g|NP ∗ and the smallest such minimal subset has
at least two individuals. Because L2(1) is different, we must now distinguish
between two subcases according to whether or not S contains 1.
Subcase L2.A.1: A subset S of {2, ..., n− 2}, say S = {2, ..., k} for 3 ≤ k ≤
n − 2 of at least two individuals is a minimal decisive set for y against z for
g|NP ∗, i.e., S does not contain 1. This requires n ≥ 5.
We also need to consider possible coalitions T decisive for z against y for
g|NP ∗. Since {1} is not decisive for y against z for g∗, we see {2, 3, ..., n− 1, n}
is decisive for z against y for g|NP ∗.
Subcase L2.A.2: A subset S = {1, ..., k} for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 is a minimal
decisive set for y against z for g∗ and so also for g|NP ∗, i.e., S does contain
1 and 2). Within this subcase we must again consider possibilities regarding
coalitions T decisive for z against y for g. But we know some coalitions decisive
for z against y due to the minimality of S: For example, {2, k + 1, ..., n− 1} is
decisive for z against y for g∗ and so {2, 3, ..., n} is decisive for z against y for
g|NP ∗.
Case L2.B: A singleton from {1, 2, ..., n − 2} is a minimal decisive set for
g|NP ∗. We again distinguish two subcases.
Subcase L2B.1: {1} is a minimal decisive set for y against z for g|NP ∗.
We also need to consider possible coalitions T decisive for z against y
for g|NP ∗.
Possibility a. 2 is excluded and {1,3,..., n-1} is decisive for z against
y for g∗ and so {1, 3, ..., n} is decisive for z against
y for g|NP ∗.
Possibility b. n− 1 is excluded and {1, 2, ..., n− 2} is decisive for
z against y for for g∗ and so also for g|NP ∗.
Subcase L2B.2: A singleton from {2, ..., n− 2}, say {2}, is a minimal
decisive set for y against z for g|NP ∗.
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We also need to consider possible coalitions T decisive for z against y
for g|NP ∗. Alternative 2 must also be in T ; and some element can be excluded
from T since we can’t have Pareto domination.
Possibility a. 1 is excluded and {2, ..., n} is decisive for z against
y for g|NP ∗.
Possibility b. An individual in {3, ..., n− 2}, say 3, is excluded
and {1, 3, ..., n} is decisive for z against y for g
on g|NP ∗.
Possibility c. n− 1 is excluded and {1, 2, ..., n− 2} is decisive
for z against y for g|NP ∗.
Case L2.C: The coalition {n− 1, n} is a (minimal) decisive set for z against
y for g|NP ∗.
Now we analyze each subcase in turn.
Subcase L2.A.1: {2, ..., k} is decisive for y against z and {2, ..., n} is decisive
for z against y for g|NP ∗.
Result 1
At profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
y
x
we have g(u1) = y since {2, ..., k} is decisive for y against z for g|NP ∗. Then
at (n− 1)-variant profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
z
y
x
y is also chosen or else n− 1 will manipulate from u2 to u1. Next, at n-variant
profile u3,
u3 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
we have g(u3) 6= z or n would manipulate from u2 to u3. Similarly, at n-variant
u4,
u4 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
y
z
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We have g(u4) 6= z or n would manipulate from u2 to u4.
Result 2
We are assuming x is chosen at L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
Then x is also chosen at L2∗:
L2∗ 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
obtained by interchanging y and z below x for individuals 2, ..., k. In turn, this
implies that at (n− 1)-variant profile u3, we get g(u3) 6= y or n− 1 manipulates
from L2∗ to u3. Then g(u3) = x.
Result 3
From earlier analysis, we know x is not chosen at L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
Then x is also not chosen at profile L1∗, obtained from L1 by interchanging y
and z below x for individuals t+ 1, ..., n− 2:
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
So also x is not chosen at 1-variant profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
or 1 would manipulate from L1∗ to u5. Then g(u4) 6= x or n − 1 manipulates
from u4 to u5.
Main Thread
By Result 1 and Result 2, x is chosen at u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
14
By Result 1 and Result 3, y is chosen at u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
y
z
But then n manipulates from u4 to u3, and g violates strategy-proofness.
Subcase L2A.2: A subset S = {1, ..., k} for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 is a minimal
decisive set for y against z for g|NP ∗, i.e., S does contain 1 and 2). Within
this subcase we must again consider possibilities regarding coalitions T decisive
for z against y for g|NP ∗. But we know some coalitions decisive for z against
y due to the minimality of S: For example, {2, k + 1, ..., n− 1} is decisive for z
against y for g|NP ∗.
Result 1.
At L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
we have g(L1) 6= x by our previous analysis. Then x is also not chosen at L1∗,
obtained by reversing y and z below x for k + 1, ..., n − 2 or else a standard
sequence argument will show a violation of strategy-proofness.
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
Then at 1-variant profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
we have g(u1) 6= x or 1 manipulates from L1∗ to u1. Then at (n − 1)-variant
u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
y
z
we have g(u2) 6= x or n− 1 manipulates from u2 to u1.
Next, at n-variant u3:
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u3 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
we get g(u3) 6= x or n manipulates from u2 to u3.
Result 2.
We are assuming x is chosen at profile L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
Then at profile u4, obtained by interchanging y and z below x for 2 to k:
u4 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
g(u4) = x by strategy-proofness.
Profile u4 is also an (n−1)-variant of u3, and g(u4) = x implies g(u3) 6=
y or n− 1 manipulates from u4 to u3. Hence g(u3) = z.
Result 3.
At profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
g(u5) = z since {1, ..., k} is minimal decisive for y against z on NP ∗. Then at
(n− 1)-variant profile u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
we have g(u6) 6= x or n − 1 manipulates from u5 to u6. Profile u6 is also a
1-variant of u4 and so g(u6) 6= z or 1 manipulates from u4 to u6. Summarizing,
g(u6) = y.
Main Thread
At profile u7, an (n− 1)-variant of u6:
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u7 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
g(u7) = y or n− 1 manipulates from u7 to u6. But u7 is also a 1 variant of u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
and g(u3) = z from Result 1 combined with Result 2. Therefore 1 manipulates
from u7 to u3, and g violates strategy-proofness.
Case L2.B: A singleton from {1, 2, ..., n− 2} is a minimal decisive set for y
against z for g|NP ∗. We again distinguish two subcases.
Subcase L2B.1: {1} is a minimal decisive set for y against z for g|NP ∗.
We also need to consider possible coalitions T decisive for z against y
for g|NP ∗.
Possibility a. 2 is excluded and {1, 3, ..., n} is decisive for z against y
for g|NP ∗.
Result 1.
At profile L2,
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
we get g(L2) = x by assumption. Then at 2-variant u1,
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
we have g(u1) = x or 2 manipulates from u1 to L2. Then at (n − 1)-variant
profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
we get g(u2) 6= y or n− 1 manipulates from u1 to u2. At n-variant profile u3,
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
z
x
y
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we have g(u3) 6= y or n manipulates from u3 to u2.
Result 2.
At profile L1,
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
we get g(L1) 6= x by an earlier analysis. Then x is also not chosen at L1∗,
obtained by switching y and z below x for individuals 3, ..., n− 2:
L1∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
Then at 1-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
x
y
z
we also have x not chosen or 1 manipulates from L1∗ to u4. Next, at (n − 1)-
variant profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
y
z
we have g(u5) 6= x or n − 1 manipulates from u5 to u4. Then g(u3) 6= x or n
manipulates from u5 to u3. Hence g(u3) = z
Result 3.
At profile L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
we have g(L2) = x by assumption. Then at 2-variant profile u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
g(u6) 6= z or 2 manipulates from u6 to L2.
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Result 4.
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
g(u7) = z since {1, 3, ..., n} is decisive for z against y on NP ∗. If g(u6) = x,
then n − 1 would manipulate from u7 to u6. Therefore, g(u6) 6= x. Hence
g(u6) = y.
Main Thread
By Result 3 and Result 4, y is chosen at u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
So y is also chosen at (n− 1)-variant u8:
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
x
z
y
or n − 1 will manipulate from u8 to u6. Then again, y is chosen at n-variant
profile u9:
u9 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
z
x
y
or n manipulates from u8 to u9.
But by Result 1 and Result 2, z is chosen at u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
z
x
y
So 2 would manipulate from u3 to u9, showing that g violates strategy-proofness.
Possibility b. n − 1 is excluded and {1, 2, ..., n − 2} is decisive for z
against y for g and so {1, 2, ..., n− 2} is decisive for z against y for g on NP ∗.
This is covered by L2.A, except when T is the singleton {1}, so here we
assume {1} is decisive for y against z and also z against y on NP ∗.
We are assuming x is chosen at L2:
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L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
So at profile u1, where y and z are interchanged below x for 2, ..., n−2, strategy-
proofness implies x is still chosen:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
z
y
This implies that at 1-variant profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
z
y
g(u2) 6= z or 1 will manipulate from u1 to u2.
Now u2 is also an (n− 1)-variant of u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
If g(u3) = z, n− 1 will manipulate from u3 to u2. So g(u3) 6= z.
But then consider n variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
where g(u4) = z since {1} is decisive for z against y on NP ∗. But then n
manipulates from u4 to u3 showing that g violates strategy-proofness.
Subcase L2B.2: A singleton from {2, ..., n− 2}, say {2}, is a minimal
decisive set for y against z for g|NP ∗. This is covered by Case L2.A since we
did not have to assume that T had more than two members. Since that proof
made no use of coalitions decisive for z against y, we also don’t need to treat
such issues here.
Case L2.C: This time we assume {n− 1, n} is a decisive coalition both
ways for g|NP ∗. We first establish two intermediate results.
Result 1
At profile u1 in NP ∗:
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u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
we have g(u1) = z by the decisiveness of {n−1, n} on NP ∗. Therefore, g(u2) 6=
x at (n− 1)-variant profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
z
y
or n− 1 manipulates from u1 to u2. We next show g(u2) 6= z.
We are assuming x is chosen at L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
Clearly a sequence of switches of y and z for individuals 2, ..., n− 2 will leave x
still chosen at profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
z
y
But then, if g(u2) = z, 1 would manipulate from u3 to u2. So g(u2) 6= z.
Combining, g(u2) = y. This, in turn, implies g(u4) = y at u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
or n− 1 manipulates from u4 to u2.
Result 2
From earlier analysis, we know x is not chosen at L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
But then at u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
z
y
x
x
y
z
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g(u5) 6= x or 1 manipulates from L1 to u5. But then at (n − 1)-variant profile
u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
y
z
g(u6) 6= x or n−1 would manipulate from u6 to u5. But then consider n-variant
u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
g(u7) 6= x or n would manipulate from u6 to u7. Note that u7 is also an (n−1)-
variant of u3 where g(u3) = x. If g(u7) = y, then n− 1 would manipulate from
u3 to u7. Therefore, g(u7) 6= y. Combining, g(u7) = z.
Main Thread
From Result 1, y is chosen at u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
and from Result 2, z is chosen at u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
y
z
x
x
z
y
Then 1 manipulates from u4 to u7, and g violates strategy-proofness.
Summarizing, we have established that x is not selected at L2 or L1 if the
range of g|NP ∗ is {y, z}.
Section 5. L3.
Case L3.A:
In this Case, we assume {1, ..., k} with 1 < k ≤ n − 2, is a minimal set
decisive for y against z. We want to show x is not chosen at L3. Assume to
the contrary that g(L3) = x.
L3 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
But x is chosen at L3 if and only if x is chosen at L3*:
22
L3* 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
with y and z switched for individuals 3 to k. Next observe that at profile u1 in
NP ∗:
u1 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
y
x
we have g(u1) = z since {1, ..., k} is minimal decisive for y against z on NP ∗.
Therefore at n-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
we also have g(u2) = z or n would manipulate from u2 to u1.
At profile u3 in NP ∗:
u3 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
we get g(u3) = y since {1, ..., k} is decisive for y against z on NP ∗. Therefore
at (n− 1)-variant u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
we also get g(u4) = y or n− 1 manipulates from u3 to u4.
Proceeding, at u5, a 2-variant of both u2 and u4:
u5 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
we have g(u5) 6= x or 2 manipulates from u2 to u5 and g(u5) 6= z or 2 manipu-
lates from u5 to u4. Therefore g(u5) = y. But then at (n− 1)-variant u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
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we get g(u6) = y or n − 1 manipulates from u6 to u5. That in turn implies
g(u7) 6= x at 2-variant u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
or 2 manipulates from u6 to u7. And then g(L3∗) 6= x or 1 manipulates from
u7 to L3*:
L3∗ 1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
· · ·
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
Case L3.B. The analysis here parallels that for L1.B: {1} is a (minimal) deci-
sive coalition for y against z for g|NP ∗. There are many possible coalitions C
decisive for z against y. These must include 1, but won’t have to be minimal,
so we choose them as large as possible (though they still have to exclude at
least one individual) since a small coalition being decisive implies supersets also
decisive. We distinguish between two possibilities:
1. The individual excluded for g∗ is in {1, ..., n − 2}, say n − 2, so
{1, ..., n− 3, n− 1, n} is decisive for z against y for g|NP ∗.
2. The individual excluded for g∗ is n − 1, so {1, ..., n− 2} is decisive
for z against y for g|NP ∗. If the minimal decisive coalition for z against y in
{1, ..., n−2} contains an alternative other than 1, we are in the situation already
covered in Case A. So we may assume that {1} is decisive for z against y as well
as for y against z for g|NP ∗. But then also {1, ..., n− 3, n− 1, n} is decisive for
z against y for g|NP ∗, and we are back to the first possibility.
So we only need to treat the case where coalition {1} is decisive for y
against z for g|NP ∗ and {1, ..., n − 3, n − 1, n} is decisive for z against y for
g|NP ∗.
Result 1.
At profile L3,
L3 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
we have by assumption, g(L3) = x. Then at 1-variant profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
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we also have g(u1) = x or 1 manipulates from u1 to L3. Then at 2-variant
profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
we also have g(u2) = x or 2 manipulates from u2 to u1. Then consider (n− 1)-
variant profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
We must have g(u3) 6= y or n− 1 would manipulate from u2 to u3.
Result 2.
At profile u4, an n-variant of u3:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u4) = y since {1} is decisive for y against z on NP ∗. But then g(u3) 6= z, or
n manipulates from u4 to u3. Hence g(u3) = x.
Result 3.
At profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
y
x
we have g(u5) = z since {1, ..., n−3, n−1, n} is decisive for z against y on NP ∗.
Then at n-variant profile u6:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
x
y
we get g(u6) = z or n manipulates from u6 to u5.
Main Thread
Combining Result 1 and Result 2, g(u3) = x at u3:
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u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
y
x
z
x
y
and also x is chosen at new profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 3 n− 2 n− 1 n
x
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
x
y
z
z
y
x
z
x
y
where y and z are switched for individuals 2 and n− 2. But then 1 manipulates
from u6 to u7.
Case L3.C: For our final case, we assume {n−1, n} is a minimal set decisive
for y against z and for z against y for g|NP ∗. We assume x is chosen at L3:
L3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
and seek a contradiction.
Result 1.
We must also have x chosen at u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
or 2 manipulates from u1 to L3. That implies g(u2) 6= y at 1-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
x
y
or 1 manipulates from u2 to u1. Then g(u3) 6= y at n-variant u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
or n manipulates from u3 to u2.
From earlier analysis, g(L2) 6= x at L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
x
z
y
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Therefore g(u3) 6= x or 2 manipulates from L2 to u3. Combining, g(u3) = z.
Then g(u4) = z at n-variant u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
y
x
or n manipulates from u4 to u3.
Result 2.
From g(u1) = x, we have g(u5) 6= z at n-variant u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
y
x
or n manipulates from u1 to u5. We get more detail about g(u5) by observing
that y is chosen at u6 in NP ∗:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
because {n−1, n} is decisive for y against z onNP ∗. Therefore at (n−1)-variant
u7
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
we have g(u7) = y or n− 1 manipulates from u7 to u6. But then g(u5) 6= x or
n manipulates from u5 to u7. Combining, g(u5) = y.
Main Thread
We now know that y is chosen at u5
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
y
x
by Result 2 and z is chosen at u4
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
x
y
z
x
z
y
· · ·
x
z
y
y
x
z
z
y
x
by Result 1. But then 1 manipulates from u5 to u4. 
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4. N−Range Theorem: Part 2.
In this section we prove
Theorem 4-1. (The N-Range Theorem, Part 2). If m = 3 and g|NP ∗ has
range of just one alternative then g must be of less than full range on NP .
The problem here is in one sense easier and in another sense harder than
in Section 3. It is easier because we don’t have to treat the many possible
comprehensive collections of decisive sets that had to be considered there. It is
harder because we have to show something a bit more complicated. In Section
3, we showed a contrapositive:
|Range(g|NP
∗
)| = 2 implies |Range(g)| = 2.
But
|Range(g|NP
∗
)| = 1 does not imply |Range(g)| = 1.
Example 1. For n > 3, let X = {x, y, z} and define g on NP as follows:
Only x and y are ever chosen; x is chosen unless everyone in {1, 2, ..., n − 2}
and one of n − 1 and n prefer y to x, in which case, y is chosen. Then g is
strategy-proof with Range(g) = {x, y}, but Range(g|NP
∗
) = {x}.
Section 4-1. Lists
We will assume g is strategy-proof with Range(g|NP
∗
) = {x} and then
construct a very short list L of profiles such that if y is chosen at any profile
in NP it will also have to be chosen at a profile in L and also a very short list
L
∗
of profiles such that if z is chosen at any profile in NP it will also have to
be chosen at a profile in L
∗
. Then, for each profile u in L, we will show that if
y = g(u), then for every profile u∗ in L
∗
, g(u∗) will not be z, so that y = g(u)
implies z is not chosen at any profile in NP and thus that g is not of full range.
To construct list L, we will analyze which profiles u (not in NP
∗
) could have
g(u) = y by paying attention to the positions of x in u(n− 1) and u(n). Once
this is done, then L
∗
can be constructed by interchanging y and z in the profiles
in L.
Case 1. Suppose g(u) = y and x is at the bottom of both u(n−1) and u(n).
Then if we can’t switch y and z in u(n− 1) and stay in NP and so NP ∗ to get
profile u′ where x is chosen, then we can switch y and z in u(n) and stay in NP
and so NP ∗to get profile u′ where x is chosen. Then the individual switching
has an incentive to manipulate back from u′ to u, violating strategy-proofness.
Similarly, g(u) = z would lead to a violation of strategy-proofness.
Case 2. Suppose g(u) = y and x is at the top of both u(n − 1) and u(n).
Then if we can’t switch y and z in u(n− 1) and stay in NP and so NP ∗to get
profile u′ where x is chosen, then we can switch y and z in u(n) and stay in NP
and so NP ∗to get profile u′ where x is chosen. Then the individual switching has
an incentive to manipulate from u to u′, violating strategy-proofness. Similarly,
g(u) = z would lead to a violation of strategy-proofness.
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We now interrupt this sequence of case-by-case analyses to learn two useful
principles.
Lemma 4-2. If even one of {1, 2, ..., n − 2} has x at the top at u, then
g(u) = x.
Without loss of generality, suppose #1 has x at the top. Then construct
u′ by bringing x to the bottom for everyone else, leaving everyone’s ordering of
y and z unchanged. Then u′ is in NP and Case 1 implies g(u′) = x. Consider
the standard sequence from u′ to u. Each profile in this sequence is in NP and
strategy-proofness implies x is chosen at each stage. So g(u) = x.
Lemma 4-3. If at u ∈ NP we have g(u) = y, then none of the individuals
in {1, 2, ..., n− 2} has y at the bottom.
Suppose to the contrary g(u) = y; without loss of generality, suppose
#1 has the ordering 1 : zxy (it can’t be xzy by Lemma 4-2). If anyone else has z
preferred to x, then #1 could interchange x and z to get x (by Lemma 4-2) and
gain. Strategy-proofness thus implies x ≻i z for all i in {2, 3, ..., n}. If any of
these individuals has y at top or bottom, that individual could interchange x and
z and still leave y chosen. But then #1 could interchange x and z to get x (by
Lemma 4-2) and gain. Therefore everyone in {2, 3, ..., n} must have the ordering
xyz. But then u(n− 1) = u(n) and we would violate Range(g|NP
∗
) = {x}.
By Lemmas 4-2 and 4-3, if g(u) = y, then all of 1, 2, ..., n − 2 have y ≻i x
at u. So at least one of n − 1 and n has x ≻i y. We now we return to our
case-by-case analysis.
Case 3. One of n− 1 and n has x on the bottom and the other has x in the
middle. Without loss of generality u is
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
y
x
y
x
· · ·
y
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
and g(u) = y. Now z can be brought to the bottom for 1 and 2 while for
3, ..., n − 2, x is brought to the bottom and y to the top, staying in NP , and
still have y chosen by strategy-proofness. This is L1, the first profile in list L:
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
(along with other profiles that can be transformed from these by switching
x and z everywhere; or switching preferences of n − 1 and n or, for L1 or,
later, L2, choosing a different individual with different ordering from others in
{1, 2, ..., n−2}, but all of these will be equivalent in that if a strategy-proof rule
could have x chosen at one but not on NP
∗
, then a rule could be designed that
had y chosen at any other one but not on NP
∗
).
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Case 4. Here x is in the middle for both. Since we are not in NP
∗
, u(n)
must be the inverse of u(n− 1). Without loss of generality, u is
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
y
x
y
x
· · ·
y
x
y
x
z
z
x
y
and g(u) = y. We will still have y chosen if z is brought to the bottom for 1 and
2, while for 3, ..., n− 2, x is brought to the bottom and y to the top, and then
interchange x and z for n− 1. But that is L1, so we don’t need to expand list
L for Case 4. That is, if y is chosen at a Case 4 profile, it must also be chosen
at a Case 1 profile.
Case 5. One of n − 1 and n has x on the top and the other has x in the
middle; without loss of generality, n − 1 has x on the top. We split this into
subcases depending on which of y and z is at the top of n’s ordering.
Subcase 5-1. Individual n has z on top; u is
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
y
x
y
x
· · ·
y
x
x z
x
y
with g(u) = y. If anyone in {1, 2, ..., n− 2} has z above x, then we could raise
x to the top for that individual and still have y chosen, contrary to Lemma 4-2.
So everyone in {1, 2, ..., n− 2} has x above z:
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
z
· · ·
y
x
z
x z
x
y
But then raising y to the top for n−1 and lowering x to the bottom for 3, ..., n−2
leaves y chosen and we are back to profile L1, so we don’t need to expand list
L for Subcase 5-1.
Subcase 5-2. Individual n has y on top; u is
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
y
x
y
x
· · ·
y
x
x y
x
z
with g(u) = y.
If n − 1 has y preferred to z, then at least one of 1, 2, ..., n − 2 must
have z preferred to y, say individual 1. Bring z to the bottom for the others in
{1, 2, ..., n− 2} and y is chosen at say
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1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
· · ·
y
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
z
Then interchange x and z below y for 3, ..., n− 2 to get
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
which we add as L2, to the list L (along with related profiles as remarked at
the end of Case 3).
On the other hand, if n − 1 has z preferred to y, then we observe that
at least one of 1, 2, ..., n− 2 must have z preferred to x, say individual 2. Bring
z to the bottom for 1 and 2 while bringing x to the bottom for 3, ..., n− 2 and
then raise y to the top for #1 and y is still chosen at
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
This is L3, the third profile we add to L (along with related profiles).
Case 6. One of n − 1 and n has x on the top and the other has x on the
bottom; without loss of generality, n− 1 has x on the top.
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
y
x
y
x
· · ·
y
x
x
x
Someone has to have z ≻i y. There are three possibilities.
A. One of {1, 2, ..., n − 2} has z ≻i y, say #1. Then bring z to the
bottom for everyone else:
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
· · ·
y
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
z
and y is still chosen. This puts us in Case 5 and no new profiles need to added
to list L.
B. Individual n has z ≻n y. Then z can be brought to the bottom for
1, 2, and n− 1, while bringing x to the bottom for 3, ..., n− 2 and still have y
chosen:
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1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
which is L4, the fourth profile in list L.
C. Individual n − 1 has z ≻n−1 y and everyone else has y ≻i z (or we
are back in A or B):
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
[x, z]
y
[x, z]
y
[x, z]
· · ·
y
[x, z]
x
z
y
y
z
x
where [x,z] indicates that x and z can be ordered in any manner below y for
each individual. Then y will still be chosen if we make z just above x for #1
and then raise x just above z in n’s ordering. This puts us in Case 5 and no
new profiles need to added to list L.
Summarizing, the list L consists of
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
L3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
L4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
along with other profiles that can be transformed from these by switching x and
z everywhere; or switching preferences of n− 1 and n or, for L1 or L2, choosing
an alternative individual with different ordering from others in {1, 2, ..., n− 2},
but all of these will be equivalent in that if a strategy-proof rule could have x
chosen at one but not on NP
∗
, then a rule could be designed that had y chosen
at any other one but not on NP
∗
.
An analogous argument allows the construction of list L
∗
such that if z is
chosen at any profile in NP , then z must be chosen at a profile in the list L
∗
.
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L
∗
can be obtained simply by interchanging y and z in list L (along with other
profiles that can be transformed from these by switching x and y everywhere; or
switching preferences of n−1 and n or permuting the individuals in {1, 2, ..., n−
2}, but all of these will be equivalent in that if a strategy-proof rule could have z
chosen at one but not on NP
∗
, then a rule could be designed that had z chosen
at any other one but not on NP
∗
).
List L
∗
is:
L1
∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
y
x
· · ·
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
L2
∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
· · ·
z
y
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
L3
∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
· · ·
z
y
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
L4
∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
y
x
· · ·
z
y
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
Our goal then is, for each choice of Li to assume g(Li) = y, to then show
that each g(Lj∗) 6= z. We actually will establish the stronger result that each
g(Lj∗) = x. We can simplify our analyses by introducing yet another list, L∗∗:
L1
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
L2
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
L3
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
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L4
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
For each Lj∗, the profile Lj∗∗ changes zyx to yzx for individuals 3, ..., n − 2.
(Alternative x is also ranked at the bottom of Lj(i) for 3 ≤ i ≤ n− 2 for all j).
Lemma 4-4.For a strategy-proof rule g,
g(Lj∗∗) = x implies g(Lj∗) = x.
Proof : Just construct a standard sequence, switching each ordering in turn;
strategy-proofness implies that x is chosen at each step. 
Lemma 4-5. For a strategy-proof rule g, g(L3∗∗) = x implies g(L2∗∗) = x
(and so, by Lemma 4-4, g(L2∗) = x).
Proof : Suppose g(L3∗∗) = x at
L3
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
This is a 1-variant of the profile
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
Then g(u1) = x or 1 manipulates from L3∗∗ to u1. Next notice that L2∗∗ is an
(n− 1)-variant of u1:
L2∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
so g(L2∗∗) = x or n− 1 manipulates from L2∗∗ to u1. 
Proof of Theorem 4-1: Because of Lemmas 4-4 and 4-5, we will show
that if g|NP
∗
has range {x} then for each i = 1, 2, 3, 4, g(Li) = y implies
g(Lj∗∗) = x for all j = 1, 3, 4 (but see Section 4-2-4).
Section 4-2. Assume g(L1) = y.
It continues to be necessary to check that each profile employed is actu-
ally in NP . But one must do so with reference to the preferences of individuals
1, 2, n− 1, and n only as we might have n = 4.
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Subsection 4-2-1. Proof that g(L1∗∗) = x.
Step 1
Let profile u1 be
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
Then g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Now consider n-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
x
y
Still g(u2) = x or n would manipulate from u1 to u2. Then look at 2-variant
u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
x
y
Then g(u3) 6= z or 2 would manipulate from u2 to u3. But now consider profile
L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
We are assuming g(L1) = y. This profile is an (n−1)-variant of u3. If g(u3) = x,
individual n − 1 would manipulate from u3 to L1. So g(u3) 6= x. Combining
with g(u3) 6= z, we have g(u3) = y.
Next consider profile u4, a 1-variant of u3:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
x
y
If g(u4) = x, then 1 would manipulate from u4 to u3; so g(u4) 6= x.
Step 2
Consider profile u5 in NP
∗
:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
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Then g(u5) = x. Look at n-variant profile u6
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
x
y
We have g(u6) = x or else n would manipulate from u5 to u6. But u6 is also a
1-variant of u4. If g(u4) = z, 1 would manipulate from u6 to u4. So g(u4) 6= z.
Step 3
Combining Steps 1 and 2, g(u4) = y. Then look at u7, an n-variant of u4:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
x
y
z
g(u7) = y or n manipulates from u4 to u7. Consider the 2-variant of u7:
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
x
y
z
g(u8) = y or 2 would manipulate from u8 to u7. Then at profile u9, a 1-variant
of u8:
u9 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
x
y
z
we have g(u9) 6= z or 1 would manipulate from u8 to u9.
Step 4
We next want to show g(u9) 6= y. But look at u10:
u10 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u10) = x since u10 ∈ NP
∗
. But then at u11, an n-variant of u10:
u11 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
x
z
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
x
y
z
we get g(u11) = x or n manipulates from u10 to u11 (or u11 to u10). Now u9
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is a 1-variant of u11. If g(u9) = y, individual 1 would manipulate from u9 to
u11; so g(u9) 6= y. Combining with Step 3, g(u9) = x.
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Consider profile
u12 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
u12 is an n-variant of u9. If g(u12) = z, then n would manipulate from u12 to
u9. So g(u12) 6= z.
Next consider profile u13:
u13 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
Here g(u13) = x since u13 is in NP
∗
. Profile u13 is an (n−1)-variant of u12. If
g(u12) = y, individual n− 1 would manipulate from u13 to u12. So g(u12) 6= y.
Therefore g(u12) = x. Then look at L1∗∗, a 2-variant u12:
L1∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
Then g(L1∗∗) = x or 2 would manipulate from u12 to L1∗∗.
Subsection 4-2-2. Proof that g(L3∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We start at profile
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
where g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Then, at u2, an (n− 1)-variant of u1:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
we see g(u2) 6= z or n − 1 manipulates from u1 to u2. Next consider u3, a
1-variant of u2:
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u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
If g(u3) = z, then 1 manipulates from u2 to u3, so g(u3) 6= z. But u3 is also a
1-variant of L1:
L1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
z
x
y
g(L1) = y by assumption. If g(u3) = x, then 1 would manipulate from u3 to
L1. So g(u3) 6= x. Combining, g(u3) = y.
Next consider
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
z
x
y
This is an (n − 1)-variant of u3 and g(u4) = y or else n− 1 would manipulate
from u4 to u3. Then look at u5, a 2-variant of u4:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
z
x
y
We have g(u5) = y or 2 would manipulate from u5 to u4. For the last part of
this step, consider u6, an (n− 1)-variant of u5:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
Then g(u6) 6= z or n− 1 manipulates from u6 to u5.
Step 2
Look at profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
g(u7) = x since u7 ∈ NP
∗
. Then look at u8, an (n− 1)-variant of u7:
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
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Then g(u8) = x or n− 1 manipulates from u8 to u7. But u8 is also a 1-variant
of u6. If g(u6) = y, individual 1 would manipulate from u8 to u6. So g(u6) 6= y.
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Combining Steps 1 and 2, g(u6) = x. But L3∗∗:
L3∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
is a 2-variant of u6, so g(L3∗∗) = x or 2 manipulates from u6 to L3∗∗.
Subsection 4-2-3. Proof that g(L4∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We start from
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
where g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Then at (n− 1)-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
we also have g(u2) = x or n − 1 manipulates from u1 to u2 or from u2 to u1.
Then at 2-variant profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
we see that g(u3) 6= y or 2 would manipulate from u2 to u3.
Step 2
We start again from a profile in NP
∗
:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
so g(u4) = x. Then at profile u5, an (n− 1)-variant of u4:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
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we see g(u5) = x or n − 1 manipulates from u5 to u4. Next examine u6, a
1-variant of u5:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
We have g(u6) 6= y or 1 manipulates from u5 to u6. But we saw earlier that
g(L3∗∗) = x so, by Lemma 4-5, g(L2∗∗) = x
L2
∗∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
Profile L2∗∗ is a 2-variant of u6; if g(u6) = z, then 2 would manipulate from
L2∗∗ to u6. So g(u6) 6= z. Combining, g(u6) = x.
Now profile u6 is also a 1-variant of profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
So g(u7) = x or 1 manipulates from u6 to u7. Profile u7 is also an n-variant of
u3. If g(u3) = z, n would manipulate from u7 to u3. Therefore, g(u3) 6= z.
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Combining Steps 1 and 2, we get g(u3) = x. But u3 is a 2-variant of L4∗∗:‘
L4∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
If g(L4∗∗) 6= x, then 2 would manipulate from u3 to L4∗; therefore, g(L4∗∗) = x.
Subsection 4-2-4. Other profiles.
We have shown that if Range(g|NP
∗
) = {x} and g(L1) = y then z is not
chosen at any of the profiles in the list L
∗∗
. But L
∗∗
was constructed by making
some arbitrary choices about profiles after having made some choices to get list
L. Those arbitrary choices in the construction of L
∗∗
then may not satisfy a
“without loss of generality” argument. We need to consider what happens with
other choices. Of course we would like to treat all possibilities, but there are
very many and each is dealt with fairly straightforwardly.
For example, construct profile T 1∗ that differs from L3∗∗ by
(I) interchanging the preference orderings for individual 1 and 2; and
also
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(II) interchanging the preference orderings for individual n− 1 and n.
T 1
∗
1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
x
y
z
We will show g(T 1∗) 6= z; in fact, we can show g(T 1∗) = x.
Earlier, in our analysis of L1∗∗, we showed x is chosen at the following
profile (which was called u12 back there):
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
Then at 2-variant profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
we get g(u2) = x or 2 manipulates from u1 to u2. Finally consider u3, an
(n− 1)-variant of u2:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
Then g(u3) = x or n− 1 manipulates from u2 to u3. But u3 is an n-variant of
T 1∗. If g(T 1∗) 6= x, n would manipulate from T 1∗ to u3. Therefore g(T 1∗) = x.
Section 4-3. Assume g(L2) = y.
Subsection 4-3-1. Proof that g(L1∗∗) = x.
At profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
we have g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Consider n-variant profile u2
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
If g(u2) = z, then n would manipulate from u1 to u2 (and u2 to u1). So
g(u2) 6= z. Profile u2 is also an (n− 1)-variant of L2:
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L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
and g(L2)= y by the assumption of this section. If g(u2) = x, then n − 1
manipulates from L2 to u2. Therefore g(u2) 6= x. Combining, g(u2) = y.
Now look at u3 a 2-variant of u2:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
Then g(u3) = y or 2 would manipulate from u3 to u2.
Next, 1-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
If g(u4) = z, then 1 manipulates from u3 to u4. So g(u4) 6= z. Next, look at
u5, an (n− 1)-variant of u4:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
g(u5) = x since u5 ∈ NP
∗
. If g(u4) = y, then n− 1 manipulates from u5 to u4.
Therefore, g(u4) 6= y. Combining, g(u4) = x.
Consider profile u6, also an (n− 1)-variant of u4:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
If g(u6) = z, then n − 1 would manipulate from u4 to u6. Also u6 is an
(n− 1)-variant of u5. If g(u6) = y, then n− 1 would manipulate from u5 to u6.
Combining, g(u6) = x.
But u6 is a 2-variant of L1∗∗:
L1∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
g(L1∗∗) = x or 2 would manipulate from u6 to L1∗∗.
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Subsection 4-3-2. Proof that g(L3∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We start with profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
where g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Then look at (n− 1)-variant u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
g(u2) = x or n− 1 manipulates from u1 to u2. Next consider 2-variant profile
u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
If g(u3) = y, then 2 manipulates from u3 to u2. So g(u3) 6= y.
Step 2
By assumption, at L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
we have g(L2) = y. Then at 2-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
we have g(u4) 6= x or 2 manipulates from u4 to L2. Next, at profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
we have g(u5) = x since u5 ∈ NP
∗
. Then at (n− 1)-variant
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u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
we get g(u6) = x or n − 1 manipulates from u6 to u5. But u6 is a 2-variant
of u4 and if g(u4) = z, then 2 would manipulate from u6 to u4. So g(u4) 6= z.
Combining, g(u4) = y.
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Profile u7 is an n-variant of u4:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
Since g(u4) = y, we must have g(u7) = y. But u7 is also a 2-variant of u3. If
g(u3) = z, then 2 would manipulate from u7 to u3. Combining, g(u3) = x.
Profile L3∗∗ is
L3∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
and so is an n-variant of u3. Then g(L3∗∗) = x or n would manipulate from u3
to L3∗∗.
Subsection 4-3-3. Proof that g(L4∗∗)= x.
Step 1
At u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
x
y
z
g(u1) = x since u1 ∈ NP
∗
. Profile u2 is an (n− 1)-variant of u1:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
x
y
z
g(u2) = x or n − 1 manipulates from u2 to u1. Then look at n-variant profile
u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
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If g(u3) = z, then n would manipulate from u3 to u2. So g(u3) 6= z.
Step 2
Now we are assuming that y is chosen at L2:
L2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
So at 2-variant profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
g(u4) 6= x or 2 manipulates from u4 to L2. But u3 is also an (n− 1)-variant
of u4 and if g(u3) = x, n− 1 would manipulate from u4 to u3. So g(u3) 6= x.
Step 3
Combining Steps 1 and 2, g(u3) = y. So at u5, an n-variant of u3:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
g(u5) = y or n manipulates from u5 to u3.
Step 4
Profile u6 is in NP
∗
:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
so g(u6) = x. Then at (n− 1)-variant profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
g(u7) = x or n− 1 would manipulate from u7 to u6.
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Consider profile u8:
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u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
Profile u8 is a 2-variant of u5 and also a 2-variant of u7. By Step 3, g(u5) = y, so
g(u8) 6= z or 2 manipulates from u5 to u8. By Step 4, g(u7) = x, so g(u8) 6= y,
or 2 manipulates from u8 to u7. Hence g(u8) = x. But u8 is a 1-variant of
L4∗∗:
L4∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
so g(L4∗∗) = x or 1 would manipulate from u8 to L4∗∗.
Section 4-4. Assume g(L3) = y.
Subsection 4-4-1. Proof that g(L1∗∗) = x.
At L3:
L3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
we have g(L3) = y by assumption. Then at 1-variant profile u1
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
we get g(u1) 6= x or 1 would manipulate from u1 to L3. Next, at u2, an n-variant
of u1:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
x
z
y
g(u2) = x since u2 ∈ NP
∗
. If g(u1) = z, then n would manipulate from u1 to
u2. So g(u1) 6= z. Combining, g(u1) = y.
The next profile, u3, is an (n− 1)-variant of u1:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
g(u3) = y or n− 1 would manipulate from u1 to u3.
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Step 2
Now look at profile u4, a 2-variant of u3:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
Then g(u4) = y or 2 manipulates from u4 to u3. Next, look at 1-variant u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
If g(u5) = z, 1 would manipulate from u4 to u5. So g(u5) 6= z. Then look at
u6, an (n− 1)-variant of u5:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
g(u6) = x since u6 ∈ NP
∗
. If g(u5) = y, then n− 1 manipulates from u6 to u5.
So g(u5) 6= y. Combining, g(u5) = x.
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Consider profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
u7 is an (n − 1)-variant of u6 and of u5. If g(u7) = y, then n − 1 manipulates
from u6 to u7; if g(u7) = z, then n−1 manipulates from u5 to u7. So g(u7) = x.
Now L1∗∗ is given by:
L1∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
so g(L1∗∗) = x or else 2 would manipulate from u7 to L1∗∗.
Subsection 4-4-2. Proof that g(L3∗∗) = x.
Step 1
At profile u1 in NP
∗
:
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u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
g(u1) = x. Then at u2, an (n− 1)-variant of u1:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
g(u2) = x or n− 1 manipulates from u2 to u1. Then consider u3, a 2-variant of
u2:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
If g(u3) = y, then 2 would manipulate from u3 to u2. So g(u3) 6= y.
Step 2
Now look at profile u4:
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
g(u4) = x since u4 ∈ NP
∗
. Then consider (n− 1)-variant profile u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
g(u5) = x or n− 1 manipulates from u5 to u4. Next look at u6, a 2-variant of
u5:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
If g(u6) = z, then 2 manipulates from u5 to u6. So g(u6) 6= z. This profile u6
is also a 2-variant of u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
x
z
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It was shown in Subsection 4-4-1 that g(L3) = y implies g(u7) = y (in that
subsection, this profile was called u1). If g(u6) = x, then 2 would manipulate
from u6 to u7. So g(u6) 6= x. Combining, g(u6) = y.
Step 3
Then at profile u8, an (n− 1)-variant of u6:
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
x
z
we have g(u8) = y or n− 1 manipulates from u6 to u8. Now look at profile u9,
an n-variant of u8:
u9 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
y
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
g(u9) = y or n manipulates from u9 to u8. But u9 is a 2-variant of u3. If
g(u3) = z, 2 manipulates from u9 to u3. So g(u3) 6= z.
Final thread
From Step 1, we got g(u3) 6= y; from step 3, g(u3) 6= z. So g(u3) = x. But
u3 is an n-variant of L3∗∗:
L3∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
g(L3∗∗) = x or n would manipulate from L3∗∗ to u3 (and u3 to L3∗∗).
Subsection 4-4-3. Proof that g(L4∗∗) = x.
In the previous subsection, we found x is chosen at profile u1 (called u3
there):
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
Consider 1-variant profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
g(u2) = x or 1 would manipulate from u1 to u2. But u2 is an (n − 1)-variant
of L4∗∗:
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L4∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
So g(L4∗∗) = x or n− 1 would manipulate from L4∗∗ to u2.
Section 4-5. Assume g(L4) = y.
Subsection 4-5-1. Proof that g(L1∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We start from
L4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
g(L4) = y by assumption. Then consider (n− 1)-variant profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
If g(u1) = x, then n− 1 manipulates from L4 to u1. So g(u1) 6= x.
Step 2
At profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
x
z
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
g(u2) = x since u2 ∈ NP
∗
. Then look at (n− 1)-variant u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
x
z
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
y
x
g(u3) = x or n − 1 would manipulate from u2 to u3. But u3 is a 2-variant of
u1. If g(u1) = z, then n − 1 would manipulate from u3 to u1. So g(u1) 6= z.
Combining with Step 1, g(u1) = y.
But then consider profile u4, an n-variant of u1,
u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
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g(u4) = y or n would manipulate from u4 to u1. But then at 1-variant u5:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
we see that if g(u5) = x, then 1 would manipulate from u5 to u4. So g(u5) 6= x.
But also g(u5) 6= z as can be seen by considering u6, an n-variant of u5:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
g(u6) = x since u6 ∈ NP
∗
. If g(u5) = z, then n would manipulate from u6 to
u5. Therefore g(u5) 6= z. Combining, g(u5) = y.
Step 3
Knowing g(u5) = y, we look at a 2-variant of u5:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
g(u7) = y or 2 would manipulate from u7 to u5. Then at u8, a 1-variant of u7:
u8 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
x
z
we see that if g(u8) = z, then 1 would manipulate from u7 to u8. So g(u8) 6= z.
Next look at (n− 1)-variant u9:
u9 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
If g(u9) = z, then n− 1 would manipulate from u8 to u9. So g(u9) 6= z.
Final thread
Consider profile u10:
u10 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
x
z
y
x
z
g(u10) = x since u10 ∈ NP
∗
. But u10 is an (n− 1)-variant of u9. If g(u9) = y,
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then n − 1 would manipulate from u10 to u9. So g(u9) 6= y. Combining with
Step 3, g(u9) = x.
Finally, look at L1∗∗, a 2-variant of u9:
L1∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
y
x
z
g(L1∗∗) = x or 2 would manipulate from u9 to L1∗∗.
Subsection 4-5-2. Proof that g(L3∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We start from g(L4) = y at
L4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
Then at 1-variant profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
x
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
if g(u1) = x, 1 would manipulate from u1 to L4. So g(u1) 6= x.
Step 2
At profile u2 in NP
∗
:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
y
x
z
y
x
we have g(u2) = x. Then consider (n− 1)-variant profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
x
y
z
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
g(u3) = x or n − 1 would manipulate from u2 to u3. But u3 is a 2-variant of
u1. If g(u1) = z, then 2 manipulates from u1 to u3. So g(u1) 6= z.
Step 3
Combining Steps 1 and 2, we have g(u1) = y. Look at 2-variant profile u4:
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u4 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
y
x
g(u4) = y or 2 would manipulate from u4 to u1. Now consider u5, an n-variant
of u4:
u5 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
If g(u5) = z, then n manipulates from u4 to u5. So g(u5) 6= z.
Step 4
Profile u6 is in NP
∗
:
u6 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
z
x
y
z
x
y
so g(u6) = x. Then (n− 1)-variant profile u7:
u7 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
y
z
x
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
has g(u7) = x or n− 1 would manipulate from u7 to u6. So g(u7) 6= x. But u7
is also a 1-variant of u5. If g(u5) = y, then 1 would manipulate from u7 to u5.
So g(u5) 6= y.
Final thread
Combining Steps 3 and 4, we get g(u5) = x. But u5 is a 2-variant of L3∗∗:
L3∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
y
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
y
z
z
x
y
g(L3∗∗) = x or 2 would manipulate from u5 to L3∗∗.
Subsection 4-5-3. Proof that g(L4∗∗) = x.
Step 1
We have already shown that g(L4) = y implies g(L3∗∗) = x and thus (by
Lemma 4-5), g(L2∗∗) = x at
L2∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
z
x
y
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Then at n-variant profile u1:
u1 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
z
x
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
we see that if g(u1) = z, n would manipulate from L2∗∗ to u1. So g(u1) 6= x.
Step 2
Next consider profile u2:
u2 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
g(u2) = x since u2 ∈ NP
∗
. But then look at (n− 1)-variant profile u3:
u3 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
y
x
z
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
g(u3) = x or n− 1 will manipulate from u2 to u3. But u3 is a 1-variant of u1.
If g(u1) = y then 1 would manipulate from u3 to u1. So g(u1) 6= y.
Final thread
Combining Steps 1 and 2, g(u1) = x. But u1 is a 1-variant of L4∗∗:
L4∗∗ 1 2 3 · · · n− 2 n− 1 n
z
x
y
z
x
y
y
z
x
· · ·
y
z
x
x
z
y
y
z
x
g(L4∗∗) = x or 1 would manipulate from u1 to L4∗∗. 
Summarizing, we have shown:
g strategy-proof on NP ⇒ [ Range(g) = {x, y, z} ⇒ Range(g|NP ∗)
= {x, y, z} ]
We have actually addressed
g strategy-proof on NP ⇒ [Range(g|NP ∗) 6= {x, y, z} ⇒ Range(g)
6= {x, y, z} ]
Now Range(g|NP ∗) 6= {x, y, z} can happen in two ways: the range can
contain two alternatives or one.
Case 1. |Range(g|NP ∗)| = 2, say Range(g|NP ∗) = {y, z}. We first
find a list {Li} of profiles such that if x is in the Range(g), then g(Li) = x for
some i. Then we show that g(Li) = x implies a violation of strategy-proofness.
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[This takes up Part 1. What makes this complicated is that all of
those violations of strategy-proofness are carried out separately for different
decisiveness structures.]
Case 2. |Range(g|NP ∗)| = 1, say Range(g|NP ∗) = {x}. [It is not
possible to do the same analysis as Case 1, because there do exist Range-two
rules on NP that have a range of one alternative on NP ∗.] We first find
(1) a list {Li} of profiles such that if y is in Range(g), then g(Li) = y
for some i, and
(2) another list {Lj∗} of profiles such that if z is in Range(g), then
g(Lj∗) = z for some Lj∗.
Then, we show that for each pair, Li, Lj∗, if both g(Li) = y and g(Lj∗) = z,
then there must be a violation of strategy-proofness.
[In the details, we actually work with a related list {Lj∗}, and show
that strategy-proofness implies g(Lj∗∗) = x and so NOT z.]
5. M-Range Theorem.
We adopt the following construction from companion paper Campbell and
Kelly (2014b). Let g be a given strategy-proof social choice function on
NP (n,m + 1) that has full range. Now we define a rule g∗ based on g. Se-
lect arbitrary, but distinct, w and z in X . Let NPwz(n,m + 1) be the set
of profiles in NP (n,m + 1) such that alternatives w and z are contiguous in
each individual ordering. Choose some alternative x∗ that does not belong to
X and set X∗ = {x∗} ∪ X\{w, z}. Then g∗ will have domain D∗ by which
we mean the domain NP (n,m) when the feasible set is X∗. To define g∗ we
begin by selecting arbitrary profile p ∈ D∗, and then we choose some profile
r ∈ NPwz(n,m+ 1) such that
1. r|X\{w, z} = p|X\{w, z}, and
2. for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, we have
{x ∈ X\{w, z} : x ≻r(i) w} = {x ∈ X\{w, z} : x ≻p(i) x
∗}.
In words, we create r from p by replacing x∗ with w and z so that w and z are
contiguous in each r(i), and r does not exhibit any Pareto domination, and in
each r(i) either w or z occupies the same rank as x∗ in p(i). In Campbell and
Kelly (2014b), we show that the selected alternative, which we can denote f(p),
is independent of the choice of profile r and so g∗ is well defined.
Lemma 5-1. If g is strategy-proof with range X , then Range(g∗) = X∗.
Before embarking on a proof of this theorem, we have to establish a lemma
about moving alternatives w and z closer together in a profile. First, some
more terminology and notation.
The position of alternative y ∈ X in the linear ordering ≻ on X is the
number 1 + |{y′ ∈ X : y′ ≻ y}|. We say that a ranks above b in ≻ if a has a
lower position number than b.
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For any two distinct alternatives a and b in X and any subset Y of
X\{a, b} we let a ≻ Y ≻ b denote the fact that a ≻ y ≻ b holds for every y ∈ Y .
Let σi(r, a, b) denote the number of alternatives strictly between a and
b in r(i). That is, σi(r, a, b) is the cardinality of the set
{y ∈ X : a ≻ y ≻ b or b ≻ y ≻ a}.
Given arbitrary alternatives a and b and profile r, Lemma 5-2 exhibits a
technique for moving alternatives around to reduce σ(r, a, b) without changing
the selected alternative. Given j ∈ N and r ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) with a ≻r(j) b we
say that profile s is obtained from r by moving b up in r(j) but not above a
(resp., moving a down in r(j) but not below b) if b ranks higher in s(j) than in
r(j) (resp., a ranks lower in s(j) than in r(j)), and s(i) = r(i) for all i ∈ N\{j},
and a ranks above b in s(j). The proof of the lemma only considers modifications
to r(j) that do not change the position of any alternative above a or below b in
r(j), to ensure that the selected alternative does not change. Such modifications
will yield enough information to allow us to prove, in the subsequent lemma,
that the range of g∗ is X∗.
Lemma 5-2: Given j ∈ N , r ∈ NP (n,m + 1), and a, b ∈ X such that
a ≻r(j) b, let Y denote the set {y ∈ X : a ≻r(j) y ≻r(j) b}.
1. If g(r) /∈ Y and there exists no u ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(u) =
g(r) and u is obtained from r by moving b up in r(j), and σj(u, a, b) < σj(r, a, b)
then b ≻r(i) Y holds for all i ∈ N\{j}.
2. If g(r) /∈ Y ∪ {a} and there exists no u ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such
that g(u) = g(r) and u is obtained from r by moving a down in r(j), and
σj(u, a, b) < σj(r, a, b) then Y ≻r(i) a holds for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Proof: We number the members of Y so that Y = {y1, y2, ..., yT } and
yt ≻r(j) y
t+1 for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., k− 1}. Let x denote g(r). We will create profile s
from r by switching the order of some alternatives in r(j), keeping s(i) = r(i)
for all i ∈ N\{j}. We will create s(j) in a way that guarantees g(s) = g(r) = x,
provided that s belongs to NP (n,m+1). (In proving 1 we will only change the
ordering of the members of Y ∪ {b} relative to each other, and b can only move
up relative to any member of Y . Therefore, the set of alternatives preferred to x
by person j will not expand, it can only shrink. The fact that x /∈ Y makes that
easy to check. In proving 2 we will only change the ordering of the members
of Y ∪ {a} relative to each other. We will move a down relative to some or all
members of Y but not in a way that changes the set of alternatives preferred to
x by person j.)
Create profile s from r by switching yT and b in r(j). If s ∈ NP (n,m+1)
then we have g(s) = x and σj(s, a, b) < σj(r, a, b). If s /∈ NP (n,m + 1) then
b ≻r(i) y
T for all i ∈ N\{j}. Suppose that we have b ≻r(i) y
t for t = ℓ, ℓ+1, ..., T
56
and all i ∈ N\{j}. If yk ≻r(i) y
ℓ−1 holds for some k ≥ ℓ and all i ∈ N\{j}
then transitivity implies that b ≻r(i) y
t holds for t = ℓ − 1, ℓ, ℓ + 1, ..., T and
all i ∈ N\{j}. Suppose that for each t ∈ {ℓ, ℓ+ 1, ..., T } we have yℓ−1 ≻r(i) y
t
for some i ∈ N\{j}. Then we can create q(j) from r(j) by moving yℓ−1 down
until it ranks just above b, keeping r(j) otherwise unchanged. If q(i) = r(i)
for all i ∈ N\{j} then we have q ∈ NP (n,m + 1) and g(q) = x. Now create
u from q by switching yℓ−1 and b in q(j), leaving q otherwise unchanged. If
u ∈ NP (n,m + 1) then we have g(u) = x and σj(u, a, b) < σj(r, a, b). If
u /∈ NP (n,m+1) then b ≻r(i) y
ℓ−1 for all i ∈ N\{j}. If this process of moving
yℓ down in person j’s ordering for successively smaller values of ℓ does not yield
a profile u ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(u) = x and σ1(u, a, b) < σ1(r, a, b) then
we will have established that
b ≻r(i) y
t for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T } and all i ∈ N\{j}.
If we do find the desired profile u then {x′ ∈ X : x′ ≻u(j) x} = {x
′ ∈
X : x′ ≻r(j) x} if x 6= b and {x
′ ∈ X : x′ ≻u(j) x} ⊂ {x
′ ∈ X : x′ ≻r(j) x} if
x = b, and hence g(u) = x.
2. Again we create profile s from r by changing the order of one or more
alternatives in r(j), keeping s(i) = r(i) for all i ∈ N\{j}. Because we create
s by lifting a member of Y just above alternative a we cannot guarantee that
x = g(r) will still be selected unless x /∈ Y ∪ {a}.
Create profile s from r by switching y1 and a in r(j). If s ∈ NP (n,m+1)
then we have g(s) = x and σ1(s, a, b) < σ1(r, a, b). If s /∈ NP (n,m + 1) then
y1 ≻r(i) a for all i ∈ N\{j}. We can proceed as we did in Part 1 but we must
apply the proof of Part 1 to the inverse of r(i) for all i ∈ N — i.e., turn the
orderings of r upside down — and with alternative a in the role of alternative b.
That is, of we let r′(i) denote the inverse of r(i) for each i ∈ N , and set a′ = b
and b′ = a then we can apply the proof of part 1 to r′, a′, and b′ by moving b′
up in r′(j). But we also have to change the names of the members of Y so that
a ≻r(j) y
T ≻r(j) y
T−1 ≻r(j) ... ≻r(j) y
2 ≻r(j) y
1 ≻r(j) b.
We will either find a profile u ∈ NP (n,m+1) with g(u) = x , u(i) = r(i)
for i ∈ N\{j}, and σ1(u, a, b) < σ1(r, a, b) or else we will establish that
yt ≻r(i) a holds for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T } and all i ∈ N\{j}.
If we do find the desired profile u then {x′ ∈ X : x′ ≻u(j) x} = {x
′ ∈
X : x′ ≻r(j) x} and hence g(u) = x. 
The social choice function g∗ derived from g is defined for two fixed
alternatives w and z. Therefore, the remaining lemma will refer to σi(p) instead
of σi(p, w, z). We let σ(p) denote the sum of the σi(p):
σ(p) = σ1(p) + σ2(p) + ...+ σn−1(p) + σn(p).
Proof of Lemma 5-1: To establish that the range of g∗ is X∗ let r be an
arbitrary profile in NP (n,m + 1). It suffices to prove that if g(r) ∈ X\{w, z}
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and σ(r) > 0 there is a profile u ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such that g(u) = g(r) and
σ(u) < σ(r), and if g(r) ∈ {w, z} there is a profile u ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that
g(u) ∈ {w,z} and σ(u) < σ(r).
Choose x ∈ X and some profile r ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such that g(r) = x.
Suppose that σ(r) > 0.
Case 1: There exists j ∈ N such that σj(r) ≥ σi(r) for all i ∈ N\{j}
and, X /∈ {w, z} and for any y ∈ X , w ≻r(j) y ≻r(j) z or z ≻r(j) y ≻r(j) w
implies y 6= x.
Without loss of generality w ≻r(j) z. Let Y = {y ∈ X : w ≻r(j) y ≻r(j) z}.
If we create s from r by moving w down in r(j), but not below z, or moving z up
in r(j), but not above z and s belongs to NP (n,m+ 1) then g(s) = x because
x /∈ Y ∪{w, z}. It follows that if we cannot find a profile u ∈ NP (n,m+1) such
that g(u) = x, u(i) = r(i) for all i ∈ N\{j}, and σ(u) < σ(r) then we have
z ≻r(i) Y ≻r(i) w for all i ∈ N\{j}
by Lemma 5-2. Because σj(r) ≥ σi(r) for all i ∈ N\{j}, all of the alterna-
tives ranking between z and w in r(i) must belong to Y for each i ∈ N\{j}.
Choose any h ∈ N\{j}. Let y∗ be the alternative just above w in r(h). Create
u from r by switching y∗ and w in r(h) leaving everything else unchanged. We
have u ∈ NP (n,m + 1) because n > 2. Then g(u) = x because x does not
belong to Y ∪ {w, z}., and σ(u) < σ(r) because we have moved w closer to z in
person h’s ordering.
Case 2: x ∈ Y for Y defined at the beginning of Case 1. (Note that
x /∈ {w, z}.)
The remainder of the proof of Lemma 5 does not actually require σj(r) ≥
σi(r) for all i ∈ N\{j}. This is important because we will have different
individuals playing the role of person j. We have w ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) z. Let
A = {a ∈ X : w ≻r(j) a ≻r(j) x} and B = {b ∈ X : x ≻r(j) b ≻r(j) z}. Then
w ≻r(j) A ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) B ≻r(j) z. We can assume that we have moved x up as
far as possible in person j’s ordering without creating Pareto dominance, and
without moving it above w.
Part 1: A 6= ∅.
Then x ≻r(i) A for all i ∈ N\{j} by Lemma 5-2. If we can move w down
in r(j) then we can reduce σ. Otherwise A ≻r(i) w for all i ∈ N\{j}. We can
reduce σ if we can move z up in r(j). Otherwise z ≻r(i) B for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Therefore, we assume that
x ≻r(i) A ≻r(i) w and z ≻r(i) B for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Let ai denote the member of A that ranks lowest in r(i).
(I) Suppose there exists h ∈ N such that z ≻r(h) w and a
h ≻r(h) w, and
no member of X ranks between ah and w in r(h).
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Clearly, z /∈ A and x ≻r(h) A ≻r(h) w and hence z ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) w. Now
move ah just below w in r(h). Alternative x will be selected at the new profile,
which belongs to NP (n.m+ 1) because n > 2 and A ≻r(i) w for all i ∈ N\{j}.
We have thereby reduced σ.
(II) Suppose there exists h ∈ N such that z ≻r(h) w and a
h ≻r(h) w and
z ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) C ≻r(h) w, with C = {c ∈ X : a
h ≻r(h) c ≻r(h) w} 6= ∅.
Note that A ∩ C = ∅ by definition of ah. If we can move w up in r(h)
above some members of C then we can reduce σ without changing the selected
alternative. (x ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) C ≻r(h) w and thus x /∈ C.) If we cannot
reduce σ in this manner then w ≻r(i) C for all i ∈ N\{h} by Lemma 5-2.
Then A ≻r(i) C for all i ∈ N\{h, j}. We can thus create r
′ from r by moving
all of the members of C above ah in r(h) without creating Pareto domination,
and without changing σ, provided that r′(h)|C = r(h)|C. Then (I) holds if we
replace r in that statement with r′, and hence there exists u ∈ NP (n,m + 1)
such that σ(u) < σ(r′) = σ(r).
(III) But suppose that z ≻r(h) w and x ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) C
1 ≻r(h) z ≻r(h)
C2 ≻r(h) w, with C
1 (resp., C2) containing all of the alternatives ranking be-
tween ah and z (resp., z and w).
Note that C (from statement II) equals C1∪C2∪{z}. Suppose that C2 6= ∅.
If we can move w up or z down in r(h), without causing Pareto dominance and
without letting z rank above w, then we can reduce σ. If we cannot reduce σ
in this matter we have w ≻r(i) C
2 ≻r(i) z for all i ∈ N\{h} by Lemma 5-2.
Clearly, C2 ∩ A = ∅ , so x ≻r(j) C
2 because w ≻r(j) C
2 and A contains all of
the alternatives ranking between w and x in r(j). We have x ≻r(h) C
2, and for
all i ∈ N\{h, j} we have
x ≻r(i) A ≻r(i) w ≻r(i) C
2.
Thus, x Pareto dominates the members of C2, contradicting r ∈ NP (n,m+
1). Therefore, C2 = ∅ if we cannot reduce σ by moving w up or z down in r(h).
Statement III and C2 = ∅ imply that there exists ah ∈ A such that
x ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) C ≻r(h) z ≻r(h) w and z and w are contiguous in
r(h), and
C contains all of the alternatives ranking between ah and z.
Of course, C ∩A = ∅. Let bh denote the highest ranking member of B
in r(h). Recall that z ≻r(i) B for all i ∈ N\{j} and hence w ≻r(h) B because
w and z are contiguous in r(h) and w /∈ B by definition.
(IV) II and w ≻r(h) b
h both hold, and no member of X ranks between
w and bh in r(h),
Create profile q from r by setting q(i) = r(i) for all i ∈ N\{j} and setting
q(j)|B = r(h)−1|B, with each member of X\B occupying the same position in
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q(j) as in r(j). Then σ(q) = σ(r) and q ∈ NP (n,m + 1) and bh is the lowest
ranking member of B in q(j). Obviously, g(q) = x and σ(q) = σ(r). Now,
create s from q by moving bh just above z in q(h) while preserving the position
of every member ofX\{bh, z, w} in q(h) = r(h). Then s ∈ NP (n,m+1) because
w ≻r(j) B, and n > 2 and z ≻r(i) B for all i ∈ N\{j}. And g(s) = x because
x ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) z. Now we switch z and b
h in s(j) = q(j). This new profile
belongs to NP (n,m+ 1) and it will have a lower value of σ than profile q.
But suppose that at least one member of X\B ranks between w and bh
in r(h). Then we have
(V) x ≻r(h) a
h ≻r(h) z ≻r(h) w ≻r(h) D ≻r(h) b
h, and z and w are
contiguous in r(h).
Here D = {y ∈ X : w ≻r(h) y ≻r(h) b
h} 6= ∅ . If we can’t move bh above
a member of D without creating Pareto domination then we have bh ≻r(i) D
for all i ∈ N\{h}. Alternative bh is the highest ranking member of B in r(h).
Therefore, D ≻r(h) b
h implies D ∩ B = ∅. Hence bh ≻r(j) D and B ≻r(j) z
imply z ≻r(j) D. We have z ≻r(h) D and, for all i ∈ N\{h, j}, z ≻r(i) B and
bh ≻r(i) D and thus z ≻r(i) D. Therefore, z Pareto dominates D, contradicting
D 6= ∅. Hence, IV holds if we can’t move bh above a member of D without
creating Pareto domination. As we have seen, this implies the existence of a
profile with a lower value of σ than r but with alternative x still being selected.
If we can move bh above a member of D then we will have statement V
with a new profile in the role of r and a proper subset D′ of D substituting for
D. We then apply the argument of the previous paragraph, eventually arriving
at statement IV with a new profile r′′ in place of r, and with σ(r′′) = σ(r). This
implies the existence of a profile u such that σ(u) < σ(r) and g(u) = x.
Part 2: A = ∅
If σ(r) > 0 and for some i ∈ N there exists an a ∈ X such that w ≻r(i)
a ≻r(i) x ≻r(i) z or z ≻r(i) a ≻r(i) x ≻r(i) w the argument of Part 1 implies
that there exists a profile in NP (n,m + 1) with a lower value of σ than σ(r).
(Part 1 assumed that w ≻r(j) a ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) z holds for some j ∈ N but by
switching the roles of w and z we can also establish the existence of a profile u
such that σ(u) < σ(r) and g(u) = x if we know that z ≻r(i) a ≻r(i) x ≻r(i) w
holds for some i ∈ N .)
Let J = {i ∈ N : w ≻r(i) z} and H = {i ∈ N : z ≻r(i) w}. Of course,
J 6= ∅ 6= H .
We may assume that for any j ∈ J there is no a ∈ X such that w ≻r(j)
a ≻r(j) x and for any h ∈ H there is no a ∈ X such that z ≻r(h) a ≻r(h) x.
If j ∈ J , let Aj = {a ∈ X : w ≻r(j) a ≻r(j) z} and if h ∈ H and
Ah = {a ∈ X : z ≻r(h) a ≻r(h) w}.
We have the following:
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If x ∈ Aj and j ∈ J we have w ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) A
j\{x} ≻r(i) z. (w and x
are contiguous in r(j).)
If x ∈ Ah and h ∈ H we have z ≻r(h) x ≻r(h) A
h\{x} ≻r(h) w. (z and
x are contiguous in r(h).)
Choose any j ∈ J . Suppose that Aj 6= ∅ and x /∈ Aj .
If we cannot reduce σ by moving z up in r(j), but not above w, or w
down (note that x would still be selected as a result) then z ≻r(i) A
j ≻r(i) w
for all i ∈ N\{j} by Lemma 5-2. Hence z ≻r(i) w for all i ∈ N\{j}, and
thus H = N\{j} and Aj ⊂ Ai for all i ∈ H . Therefore, Ai 6= ∅ for any
i ∈ H . Suppose x /∈ Ah and h ∈ H . If we cannot move w up or z down
without changing the selected alternative or creating Pareto domination we
have w ≻r(i) A
h ≻r(i) z, and thus w ≻r(i) z, for all i ∈ N\{h}. This contradicts
n > 2 and H = N\{j}. Therefore,
j ∈ J and x /∈ Aj 6= ∅ implies H = N\{j} and x ∈ Ah for all h ∈ H .
Continuing to assume that x /∈ Aj 6= ∅, we have
z ≻r(i) x ≻r(i) A
i\{x} ≻r(i) w, and z and x are contiguous in r(i), for
all i ∈ H = N\{j}.
Choose any h ∈ H and any a ∈ Aj . Then a 6= x. Because Aj ⊂ Ai for all
i ∈ H we have z ≻r(i) a ≻r(i) w for all i ∈ H .
Choose any two distinct h and k ∈ H . If we cannot reduce σ by moving
w up in r(k) without changing the selected alternative then w ≻r(i) A
k holds
for all i ∈ N\{k}. But a ∈ Ak and thus we have z ≻r(h) a ≻r(h) w ≻r(h) a,
contradicting transitivity of r(h).
We are forced to conclude that for all i ∈ N , if Ai 6= ∅ then x ∈ Ai.
(If z ≻r(i) A
i ≻r(i) w and x /∈ A
j 6= ∅ then we also arrive at a contradiction if
we assume that we cannot reduce σ without changing the selected alternative.)
We are assuming that A = ∅ which means that w ≻r(i) x and w and x are
contiguous in r(i) for all i ∈ J , and z ≻r(i) x and z and x are contiguous in r(i)
for all i ∈ H . For i ∈ J , let Bi = {b ∈ X : x ≻r(i) b ≻r(i) z}, and for i ∈ H let
Bi = {b ∈ X : x ≻r(i) b ≻r(i) w}. If j ∈ J and we cannot reduce σ by moving
z up in r(j) without changing the selected alternative then z ≻r(h) B
j for all
h ∈ N\{j}. If h ∈ H and we cannot reduce σ by moving w up in r(h) without
changing the selected alternative then w ≻r(j) B
h for all j ∈ N\{h}. Therefore
z ≻r(h) B
j for all j ∈ J and h ∈ H , and
w ≻r(j) B
h for all j ∈ J and h ∈ H .
Suppose that Bj 6= ∅ for some j ∈ J . Let b∗ denote the member of Bj
ranked lowest in r(j). If i ∈ J and b∗ ≻r(i) w then b
∗ ≻r(i) z and we can switch
z and b∗ in r(j) thus reducing σ without changing the selected alternative or
creating Pareto domination. Therefore, we may assume w ≻r(i) b
∗ for all i ∈ J .
Because w and x are contiguous in r(i) for all i ∈ J we have x ≻r(i) b
∗ for all
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i ∈ J . Then x ≻r(i) b
∗ for all i ∈ N because z ≻r(h) B
jfor all h ∈ H , and z and
x are contiguous in r(h) for all h ∈ H . Similarly, if Bh 6= ∅ for some h ∈ H
then there is an instance of Pareto domination at profile r.
Assume, then, that there exist j ∈ J and h ∈ H such that Bj ∩ Bh 6=
∅. For b ∈ Bj ∩ Bhand j ∈ J we have w ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) b ≻r(j) z ≻r(j) b,
contradicting transitivity. (Note that x ≻r(j) b holds because j ∈ J and b ∈ B
j .
And z ≻r(j) b holds because h ∈ H and b ∈ B
h.)
Therefore, if we can’t reduce σ without changing the selected alternative
we have
w ≻r(j) x ≻r(j) z for all j ∈ J and z ≻r(h) x ≻r(h) w for all h ∈ H ,
and
for all j ∈ J and all y ∈ X\{w, x, z}, if w ≻r(j) y ≻r(j) z then
y = x, and
for all h ∈ H and all y ∈ X\{w, x, z}, if z ≻r(h) y ≻r(h) w then
y = x.
(No alternatives rank between w and x or between x and z for any i ∈ N .)
We now use g and r to define a social choice function µ with domain
NP (n, 3) and X = {w, x, z}. Given profile ρ ∈ NP (3, 3) let p ∈ NP (n,m+ 1)
be the profile for which, for all i ∈ N ,
p(i)|{α, β, γ} = ρ(i),
and for all y ∈ X\{w, x, z} alternative y has the same position in p(i) as r(i).
Refer to p as the extension of ρ. For any ρ′ ∈ NP (n, 3) set µ(ρ′) = g(p′) for
the extension p′ of ρ′.
Suppose that |H | ≥ 2. Create u from r by switching x and z in r(h) for
some h ∈ H . We will have u ∈ NP (n,m+1) and g(u) = x. Now create s from u
by switching x and z for some j ∈ J . Create profile t from u by switching x and
w for some h ∈ H . If g(s) = x or g(t) = x then we have reduced σ and hence are
finished the proof of Case 2. If g(s) 6= x and g(t) 6= x then strategy-proofness of
g implies that g(s) = z and g(t) = w, in which case the range of µ is {x, z, w}.
Then the rule µ is dictatorial because m = 3. If at ρ′ the dictator has x ranked
above both w and z and the other members of N have the opposite ranking of
the three alternatives we will have µ(ρ′) = x. Because g is strategy proof it will
select x at the extension of ρ′. Because x ranks between w and z in r(i) for
each i ∈ N we have reduced σ. Similarly, if |J | ≥ 2 we can reduce σ, without
changing the selected alternative x.
Case 3: x ∈ {w, z}.
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To prove that x∗ is in the range of g∗ we only need to show that a member
of {w, z} is selected by g at some profile in NP ∗ (n,m+1). Let r be any profile
in NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(r) = w.
Suppose that for any i ∈ N such that w ≻r(i) z the alternatives w and
z are contiguous in r(i). Then σ(r) > 0 implies that there exists h ∈ N such
that z ≻r(h) C ≻r(h) w for some nonempty subset C of X\{w, z}. If there is no
profile u ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(u) = w and σ(u) < σ(r) then we cannot
create a profile u from r by moving w up in r(j) (ensuring that w will still
be selected) and hence, by Lemma 5-2, we have w ≻r(i) C for all i ∈ N\{h}.
Then w ≻r(i) z implies w ≻r(i) z ≻r(i) C because w ≻r(i) C and w and z are
contiguous in r(i). And z ≻r(i) w for i 6= h implies z ≻r(i) w ≻r(i) C and
hence z ≻r(i) C. We also have z ≻r(h) C and thus z ≻r(i) C for all i ∈ N ,
contradicting C 6= ∅ and r ∈ NP (n,m+ 1). We have proved that if w ≻r(i) z
implies that w and z are contiguous in r(i) then σ(r) = 0.
Suppose then that there exists j ∈ N such that w ≻r(j) z and w and z
are not contiguous in r(j). Let Y denote the nonempty set {y ∈ X : w ≻r(j)
y ≻r(j) z}. If we cannot create a profile u ∈ NP (n,m+1) from r by moving z up
in r(j) but not above w — guaranteeing that the selected alternative does not
change and σ decreases — then, by Lemma 5-2, we have z ≻r(i) Y for all i 6= j.
If for any i ∈ N such that z ≻r(i) w the alternatives w and z are contiguous in
r(i) then z ≻r(i) w implies z ≻r(i) w ≻r(i) Y because z ≻r(i) Y . If w ≻r(i) z
and i 6= j then w ≻r(i) z ≻r(i) Y and hence w ≻r(i) Y . Because Y 6= ∅ and
we also have w ≻r(j) Y we have contradicted the fact that r exhibits no Pareto
domination. Therefore, there exists k ∈ N\{j} such that z ≻r(k) D ≻r(k) w for
some nonempty subset D of X . If there is no profile u ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such
that g(u) = w and σ(u) < σ(r) then we cannot create a profile u from r by
moving w up (ensuring that w will still be selected) or z down in r(k) then,
by Lemma 5-2, we have w ≻r(i) D ≻r(i) z for all i ∈ N\{k}. In particular,
w ≻r(j) D ≻r(j) z and hence D ⊂ Y . But n > 2, and for i ∈ N\{j, k}
we have w ≻r(i) D ≻r(i) z ≻r(i) Y , contradicting transitivity of r(i) and the
fact that D is a nonempty subset of Y . Therefore, there must exist a profile
u ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(u) = w and σ(u) < σ(r). 
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